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ABSTRACT
As well as highlighting the importance of introducing counter cyclical capital buffers, this paper 
draws attention to the need for greater focus on “more forward looking provisions”, as well  as 
provisions which are aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems attributed to “maturity 
transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans.” Whilst the need for forward looking 
provisioning has been echoed by some authorities on the literature, the paper also adds weight to the 
argument through its attempt to link such an argument to the ever increasing prominence assumed 
by liquidity risks – since liquidity also contributes to pro cyclicality.
“The complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions - which to a large 
extent,  is  attributed  to  liquidity  shortfalls  which  reflected  on  and  off  balance  sheet  maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels  of leverage,  has resulted in an increasingly important  role for 
liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.” Owing to such increased 
importance  of  liquidity  risks,  this  paper  also attempts  to  highlight  why the  Basel  Committee’s 
Counter Cyclical Buffer Proposal – a response to the recent financial crisis (which to a significant 
extent, focuses on banking sector capital requirements), should also take greater account of more 
forward looking provisions. In so doing, it draws attention to the importance of coupling forward 
looking provisions (as well as other measures) with counter cyclical charges and why this provides 
a better alternative to the mere introduction of counter cyclical capital charges.
Key Words: Counter cyclical buffers, liquidity risks, pro cyclicality, capital, loan loss provisions, 
financial crises, bank, regulation
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Measures Aimed at Mitigating Pro Cyclical Effects of the Capital Requirements 
Framework: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposals
Marianne Ojo1
Introduction
In its consultative document on “Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal”2 the Basel Committee 
highlights the principal aim of the proposal, namely “ the implementation of buffers of capital to 
achieve the broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess 
aggregate credit growth which have been linked to the build up of system wide risk.”3 A further 
benefit of the proposal which is attributed to the aim of protecting the banking sector from the credit 
cycle is its potential to assist in “leaning against the build-up phase” of the cycle in the first instance 
– this occurring (according to the Committee), through the capital buffer acting to raise the cost of 
credit – hence dampening and reducing its demand.4
This paper aims to highlight reasons attributed to the importance of introducing counter cyclical 
capital buffers – the principal focus being the need to mitigate pro cyclical effects. In so doing it 
commences with an introduction on how such pro cyclical effects arise and why they need to be 
addressed. The paper also illustrates that even though it is increasingly acknowledged that capital, 
on its own, cannot address system wide risks (owing to the growing importance and significance of 
liquidity risk), that current measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclical effects focus primarily on 
capital. Hence the need to introduce counter cyclical buffer proposals which are also linked to the 
redress of  liquidity risks, also constitutes an objective which the paper aims to address. Such need 
will be considered under the fourth section of this paper which considers recommendations made by 
the Financial  Stability Forum and which specifically (and importantly)  includes  bank loan loss 
provisions.  Thus  whilst  progress  with  measures  aimed  at  ensuring  that  banking  systems  are 
equipped with buffers of capital (to protect them against future losses) is very much appreciated, 
greater focus on other measures aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems attributed to 
“maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans”5 (which exposes banks to such 
vulnerabilities as liquidity risks) are required.
One  of  the  principles  which  were  highlighted  by  the  Basel  Committee  as  constituting  vital 
components  of  a  “global  financial  stability  framework”  is  namely,  the  principle  that  “All 
macroeconomic policies need to be counter cyclical, building up buffers in good times that can be 
1 Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen , Teaching Associate Oxford 
Brookes University, Oxford.
2 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July  2010  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at  page  2.  The  Consultative  Document  interestingly 
highlights the fact that the Counter Cyclical Proposal is not a Pillar 2 approach – since “it does not relate to supervisor 
review of individual banks.” see ibid at page 12. Furthermore, the Consultative Document addresses the treatment of 
surplus when buffer returns to zero by indicating that “the Basel Committee’s working assumption is that the capital 
surplus created when the counter cyclical buffer is returned to zero, should be unfettered – that is, no restrictions should 
be imposed on distributions when the buffer is turned off.” See ibid at page 13
3 Further, the Committee adds that since capital is more expensive than other forms of funding, the build up of defences  
(such as capital  defences  which are built  up by banks during periods where “the risks of  system-wide stress” are 
characterised by significant and marked levels of growth) may provide the additional benefit of helping to stabilise 
excessive credit growth levels during periods of economic and financial booms. See ibid.
4  See ibid at page 3
5  See Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision September 2008 at page 1 (page 7 of 44) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
run down in bad times. In particular, fiscal authorities need to reduce debt levels in good times in 
order to have the capacity to respond at times of stress. “6
Whilst  it  is contended that monetary policies should be aimed at  the control of inflation,  fiscal 
policies are considered to have the role of “counter cyclical demand management.”7
A. Pro cyclicality8 
Pro cyclicality is  a term used to  denote “  the self-reinforcing mechanisms within the financial 
system and between the financial system and the real economy that can exacerbate boom and bust 
cycles, undermining financial and macroeconomic stability. These effects are most prominent in the 
downward  phase.  As  strains  develop,  previously  unseen  risks  materialise,  deepening  the 
retrenchment that is already under way.”9 Furthermore, it is not only contended that “the effects of 
pro cyclicality are critical (but hidden) in the expansion phase, when the underlying risks build up, 
but that historical experience reveals that credit mistakes are made during the boom phase but are 
revealed only during the bust.” 
An example of a “fundamental” source of pro cyclicality as provided by the Committee of the 
European Banking Supervisors(CEBS),10 is attributed to “excessive risk-taking during periods of 
expansion, which results in the build up of vulnerabilities”.
Some of the recommendations put forward and highlighted as means of addressing pro cyclicality 
include:11
- A policy response founded on the build up and run down of capital buffers in a counter 
cyclical  fashion over the business cycle. These safety margins must be built  up in good 
times,  when it is easier and cheaper to do so.12 Such a build-up will restrain risk-taking 
during the expansion phase of the business cycle. During periods of recession, these buffers 
can  be  run  down,  allowing  the  system  to  absorb  emerging  strains  more  easily  and 
dampening the feedback mechanisms. 
- The importance of distinguishing between the regulatory minimum capital requirement and 
buffers operating above the minimum requirements. A breach of the regulatory minimum 
brings with it  severe consequences,  which could result  in  a bank being shut  down. The 
6  See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 2 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
7  ibid at page 6. Furthermore, it is added that consideration should be given to “the need to maintain fiscal buffers 
that  allow a response to financial  system stress -  which implies that  government debt should be maintained at 
reasonably low levels in good times so that additional debt can be taken on in times of stress without unsettling 
financial markets.” See ibid at page 7
8  Pro cyclicality is also the tendency for periods of financial/economic downturns or booms to be further 
exacerbated by certain economic policies. For further considerations on the possible consequences of according a 
high degree of prominence to certain economic objectives, see M Ojo, „Social Rights and Economic Objectives: The 
Importance of Competition at Supra National Level „ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651610
9  See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 16 and 17 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
10  Furthermore, the CEBS defines pro cyclicality as comprising “mechanisms through which the financial system can 
amplify business fluctuations that are particularly disruptive during an economic downturn or when the financial 
system is faced with pressures.” See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter 
Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at page 34
11  H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 16 and 17 of 26
12 ibid; also see Bank for International Settlements, “Addressing financial system procyclicality: a possible framework”, 
Note for the FSF Working Group on Market and Institutional Resilience, April 2009. 
buffers are intended to be built up in good times so that they can absorb losses without the 
bank becoming insolvent.”
The Basel Committee has proposed building up these buffers through a combination of counter 
cyclical capital charges, forward-looking provisioning and capital conservation measures.13 It is also 
recommended that other potential macro prudential instruments such as loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
should be explored.
Jimenez and Saurina, Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano are amongst several other academics who 
have put forward proposals aimed at addressing pro cyclical problems.14 The proposal put forward 
by Jimenez and Saurina “focuses on an additional flow of loan loss provisions – in addition to 
specific and general  provisions.”15 Such a design is  aimed at  addressing the “future increase in 
credit  risk deriving from too lenient  credit  standards  during periods of economic booms.”16 As 
observed by the CEBS, whilst a similar proposal (to that of Jimenez and Saurina) was also put 
forward by Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano, some reservations on the potential and efficiency of 
the present applicable principle for policy intervention (that is, conserving buffers in the system 
during periods of economic booms – for the purposes of “controlled” utilisation of such buffers 
during periods of economic pressures), were expressed by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein.17 
The promotion of financial stability through more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes 
one  of  Basel  II’s  primary  objectives.18 However  some  problems  identified  with  Basel  II  are 
attributed to pro cyclicality and to the fact that not all material credit risks in the trading book are 
adequately accounted for in the current capital requirements.19 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II 
has  been  criticised since  “capital  requirements  for credit  risk as  a  probability  of  default  of  an 
exposure decreases in the economic upswing and increases during the downturn”20 – hence resulting 
13  See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 16 of 26 http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf and also Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector – consultative document, December 2009.
14  For further information on this see Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter 
Cyclical  Capital  Buffer”  July 2009  at  page  34.  “Studies  which  were  included  and  reviewed  in  the  Dynamic 
Operation Project (DOP) of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) – which addressed the issue of 
the cyclicality of Pillar One capital requirements include those of Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano along with 
Kashyap and Stein. The DOP report examined several academic papers that implemented simulation approaches to 
estimate the magnitude of the cyclical variations of Basel II requirement over the business cycle.” See ibid at page 
33.
15  See ibid at page 33
16 “Given that the provision is positive during periods of economic booms, and negative during periods of recessions, 
it is argued that such a provision should have a counter cyclical impact on banks’ lending policies.” ibid
17  It is acknowledged that “time-varying capital requirements represent a potentially important improvement over the 
current time invariant approach in Basel II because they allow some of the rainy day funds to be spent when it rains 
– thereby reducing the pressure on banks to liquidate assets (as well as associated negative spill overs for the rest of 
the economy. However, time varying capital requirements are also acknowledged to be problematic from a cost 
perspective”  See  ibid  at  page  36;  see  also  Jimenez  and  Saurina  ,  “Credit  Cycles,  Credit  Risk,  and  Prudential 
Regulation” (2006) International  Journal  of  Central  Banking,  vol.2,  no.2;  Goodhart,  Hofmann and Segoviano , 
“Bank Regulation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations” (2004) Oxford Review of Economic Policy,  vol.  20,no. 4; 
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, “Rethinking Capital Regulation”, Paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City symposium on “Maintaining stability in a Changing Financial System”, Jackson Hole, August 2008.
18  For further objectives, see , Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
remuneration policies. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf > at page 22 of 47
19  See ibid at page 23 of 47
20  See Annex on Proc cyclicality, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
remuneration policies. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> at page 46 of 47
in  capital  requirements  which  fluctuate  over  the  cycle.  Other  identified21 consequential  effects 
include the fact that fluctuations in such capital requirements may result in credit institutions raising 
their capital during periods when its is costly22 for them to implement such a rise – which has the 
potential of inducing banks to cut back on their lending. It is concluded that “risk sensitive capital 
requirements should have pro cyclical effects principally on undercapitalised banks.”23
Regulators will be able to manage systemic risks to the financial system during such periods when 
firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend where more market participants such as 
credit rating agencies, could be engaged in the supervisory process. The Annex to Pro cyclicality in 
the Accompanying Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive24 not only importantly 
emphasises the fact that regulatory capital requirements do not constitute the sole determinants of 
how much  capital  banks  should  hold,  but  also  highlights  the  role  of  credit  rating  agencies  in 
compelling banks to increase their capital levels even where such institution may be complying with 
regulatory requirements.
The fact that “adjustments (for individual institutions’ contributions to systemic risk) would actually 
exacerbate  pro  cyclicality,  has  been  highlighted.25 A second  and  further  consequence  of  using 
“certain  market  based  measures  of  systemic  risk  to  address  the  time  dimension”  is  that,  “the 
measures would provide the wrong signal:  Systemic risk would look low when, in fact,  it  was 
actually high.”26
Even though the implementation of higher levels of capital buffers could serve as a means for the 
management of systemic risks, liquidity requirements27 have also been acknowledged by many as 
having a fundamental role to play in mitigating contagion – hence assuming a role which is similar 
to that of capital buffers.28 The link between counter cyclical buffers, capital and liquidity standards 
is further demonstrated through the impact which is generated as a result of the implementation of 
capital and liquidity standards. Counter cyclical buffer schemes could serve as means of enhancing 
21  As identified in the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. 
See page 46 of 47
22 Liquidity, a topic which will be addressed in the next section, is also considered to be “highly pro cyclical, growing in 
good times and drying up in times of stress.” During the build up to the present  crisis,  banks and other financial  
institutions had an incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity. See Report of the Financial Stability Forum on 
Addressing  Pro  cyclicality  in  the  Financial  System  “Measuring  and  Funding  Liquidity  Risk”  at  page  24 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
23  See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 at 
page 150
24  Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 46 of 47
25  See C Borio, “Implementing a Macro Prudential Framework : Blending Boldness and Realism” Bank for 
International Settlements Publications at page 8 <http://www.bis.org/repofficepubl/hkimr201007.12c.pdf?
noframes=1>
26  ibid
27  “However, the analysis of the impact of liquidity standards is considered to present specific challenges. Under the 
Proposal put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in December 2009, banks will be required to 
meet two new liquidity requirements – a short term requirement called the Liquidity Coverage Ration (LCR) and a 
long term requirement called the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The Proposal focuses mainly on the NSFR – 
which is considered to be the more relevant constraint to macro economic effects on a longer term basis.” See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and 
Liquidity  Requirements”  Bank  for  International  Settlements  Publications  August  2010  at  page  7 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
28  See particularly R Cifuentes, G Ferrucci and HS Shin, “Liquidity Risk and Contagion” (2005) Journal of the 
European Economic Association Volume 3 at pages 556-566 http://www.bri.org/bcbs/events/rtf04shin.pdf 
the following effects which are generated by higher capital and liquidity standards, namely:29
- Making the financial system more resilient and:
- Reducing the amplitude of the business cycles within the financial system.
The association between systemic  risks  and liquidity risks  and the rather  apparent  lack  of  due 
recognition accorded to liquidity risks under Basel II, constituted other reasons for the growing 
criticism of Basel II.
B. Liquidity Risk
The definition of liquidity,  as provided by the Bank of International Settlements  (BIS),  is  “the 
ability  of  a  bank  to  fund increases  in  assets  and  meet  obligations  as  they come  due,  without 
incurring unacceptable losses.  The fundamental  role  of banks in the maturity transformation of 
short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of 
an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.”30
In their  report  on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial  System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) noted that at the onset of the recent financial 
crises, the complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions, was to a 
large extent, attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected “on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels of leverage.”31 This has resulted in an “increasingly important role 
for liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.”32 Furthermore, the 
FSF  highlighted  the  urgency  of  both  authorities,  namely,  supervisors  (in  their  monitoring  of 
liquidity risks at banks) and central banks (in their design and implementation of market operations) 
collaborating in order to “ restore the functioning of inter bank lending markets.”33
As identified in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, “the specific knowledge that banks possess 
about their borrowers make bank loans particularly illiquid.”34 The connection between liquidity 
and systemic risks is further highlighted in the Review where it elaborates on possible consequences 
resulting  from a  bank’s  failure,  namely:35 The  “destruction”  of  such specific  knowledge which 
banks have about  their  borrowers and the reduction of  “the common pool  of  liquidity.”36 Such 
reduction in the common pool of liquidity may also trigger the failure of other banks – with the 
result that i) the value of such illiquid bank assets diminishes and ii) further problems within the 
banking systems are aggravated.37
“Endogenous risks” could also be generated depending on the type of information which the bank 
29  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 
Capital and Liquidity Requirements” Bank for International Settlements Publications August 2010 at page 5 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
30  Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 at page 1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
31Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk”  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
32 ibid
33 „In order to counter the transfer of funding liquidity risk by systemically important financial institutions to the 
public sector“ ;ibid
34   “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?
a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64f at page 137
35  ibid 
36  ibid
37  ibid
possesses about their borrowers and how the dissipation of such information to the public, if it has 
the potential to trigger a bank run, can be prevented.
According Greater Attention to Liquidity Risks
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled “Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact that many banks 
had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk management  during 
periods of abundant liquidity.38
An  extensive  review  of  its  2000  “Sound  Practices  for  Managing  Liquidity  in  Banking 
Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of addressing matters and 
issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial Crises.39 
In  order  to  consolidate  on  the BCBS  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  
Supervision  of September 2008, which should lead to improved management and supervision of 
liquidity  risks  of  individual  banks,  supervisory  bodies  will  be  required  “to  develop  tools  and 
policies to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at the aggregate level”.40
In responding to the apparent gaps which exist with Basel II – as revealed by the recent crises, 
proposals which are aimed at imposing penalties for the occurrence of maturity mismatches41 have 
been  put  forward.42 The  degree  of  disparity  which  exists  between  the  maturity  of  assets  and 
liabilities  is  crucial  to  determining  the  state  of  a  company’s  liquidity.  Such penalties  aimed at 
deterring the occurrence of maturity mismatches could include “higher capital  requirements  for 
banks which finance their assets with overnight borrowing from the money markets than banks 
which finance similar assets with term deposits.”43
The inability  of  bank  capital,  on  its  own,  to  address  funding  and liquidity  problems has  been 
acknowledged by  many  academics.  As  a  result,  further  proposals,  in  addition  to  the  above 
mentioned  amendment  to  Basel  II,  have  been  put  forward.  These  include  the  coupling  of  the 
existing regulatory framework with capital  insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms.44 Such 
proposals are aimed at “giving banks the right incentives ex ante and at improving the resilience of 
the financial system to shocks  ex post.45 Furthermore, the ECB’s Financial Stability Review also 
highlights  proposals  which  are  aimed  at  supplementing  Basel  II  regulation  through  the 
38  Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
39 ibid
40   “The FSF proposes that the BCBS and CGFS develop a joint research effort to address funding and liquidity risk, 
starting in 2009. A key component of this research agenda is to define robust measures of funding and liquidity risk, 
which could assist  assessments of liquidity risk by the private sector.  Stress  tests to gauge the probability and 
magnitude  of  a  liquidity crisis  in  different  market  environments  will  be  considered  in  this  light.”  For  further 
information on this, see  Report  of the Financial  Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial 
System: Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at 
page 24
41  A situation which could occur where an undertaking possesses more short term liabilities than short term asset. 
It could also occur where more assets are held (than liabilities) for medium and long term obligations.
42  See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
at page 148 and particularly Brunnermeier et al whose proposal includes the requirement of greater capital, “not 
only against the risk of assets, but also against the risk of funding such assets.”
43  Ibid at 148
44  Brunnermeier et al, Kashyap et al, and Perrotti and Suarez are all of the opinion that even though 
liquidity assistance to help banks cope with aggregate liquidity shocks is commendable, it would generate minimal 
benefits where such banks are not provided with the right incentives to reduce the probability of such shocks in the 
first place. For further information on this, see “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” 
Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 149
45  ibid
establishment of a mandatory liquidity insurance arrangement - whereby each bank has to pay the 
supervisor a liquidity charge.46
Even  though  the  Basel  Committee  states  (in  its  Consultative  Document)  that  its  Counter 
Cyclical  Capital  Buffer Proposal is  not a  Pillar  2 approach “since it  does not relate  to the 
supervisor  review of  individual  banks”47,  the Committee  of  European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) highlights the fact that “whilst forward looking systems of capital buffers for banks 
should  be  designed  within  the  boundaries  of  the  existing  framework  and  that  identified 
mechanisms could be employed alternatively under Pillar One, that its implementation under 
Pillar Two is still considered to be the most sensible option at the time.”48
The  Committee  of  European  Banking  Supervisors  classifies  Pillar  2  capital  buffers  into  two 
components – the first being aimed at “building sufficient additional resources (above regulatory 
minimum) whilst the second is aimed at “covering losses arising from extreme events.”49 Whilst the 
CEBS is also of the opinion that rating agencies appear to prefer Pillar One solutions (which are 
considered to be more transparent and less prone to national discretions), it also draws attention to 
the fact that Pillar 2 would allow for quicker responses and may be used for testing tools (which 
will be subsequently improved and possibly implemented under Pillar One).50
C. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II
Basel III
The more refined and consolidated Basel II framework - along with “macro prudential overlay” [the 
objective of this “macro prudential overlay” comprising i) the redress of stability over time (that is, 
to  address  pro  cyclicality),  and  ii)  the  redress  of  stability  at  each  point  in  time  (system-wide 
approach], 51 is referred to as Basel III.52 Means through which “stability over time (pro cyclicality)” 
could be achieved include:53
- Through counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning
- Capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers.”
According to a report,54 the two principal solutions which have been endorsed by the Turner Review 
and the DeLarosiere Report, and which are considered to have the potential to reduce pro cyclical 
effects55 induced by the CRD and Basel II, include: 1) The requirement that banks “hold bigger 
46  ibid
47  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July 2010 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 2.
48 Committee of European Banking Supervisors “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
pages 1 and 2 <http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-
countercyclical-capital-b.aspx>
49  ibid at page 3
50  ibid at page 4; On this basis, members of the CEBS conclude that “any counter cyclical adjustments should be 
calibrated to individual banks’ portfolios and based on risk sensitive concepts.” See ibid.
51  See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
52  ibid
53  ibid; Means whereby stability at each point in time (system-wide approach) could be achieved include through 
“systemic capital surcharge for systemically important financial institutions; the identification of inter linkages and 
common exposures among all financial institutions; and the systemic oversight of OTC derivatives.” ibid.
54 The Turner Review :Key Elements of the Turner Review (page 2 of 4) <http://www.dlapiper.com>
55 Exacerbated strains on bank capital is the term used to denote pro cyclicality ; see ibid 
International  Accounting Standards  are also considered  to  have had a pro-cyclical  impact.  It  is  stated that  “in 
reserves during good times - hence limiting credit and risk expansion in good times and storing up 
capital to be used during bad times” (2) “Increasing risk-weighting on a range of assets because this 
also restricts balance sheet expansion”. 
Another proposal put forward as an optimal means of rectifying Basel II's pro cyclical effects – as 
illustrated through the “amplification of business cycle fluctuations”, involves the utilisation of a 
“business cycle multiplier of the Basel II capital requirements that is increasing in the rate of growth 
of  the  GDP”.  Under  such  a  scheme,  it  is  argued,  riskier  “banks  would  face  higher  capital 
requirements without regulation exacerbating credit bubbles and crunches.”56
Other mechanisms provided under the CRD as means of mitigating pro cyclicality within the capital 
requirements framework include:57
The use of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates, PD estimates being based on long data 
series, technical adjustments made to the risk weight function, stress testing requirements and Pillar 
2 supervisory review process. It is acknowledged, however, that more measures may be required to 
mitigate the pro cyclical effects of the capital requirements framework. Options provided include 
those aimed at reducing its cyclical risk sensitivity, measures which enhance its risk capture, and the 
intentional introduction of counter-cyclical buffers (comprising capital and/or provisions). 
A counter cyclical capital charge, it  is contended,58 “would require financial institutions to hold 
more capital during buoyant periods whilst lowering the regulatory capital levels during periods of 
stress.” Other capital conservation measures include “actions aimed at limiting excessive dividend 
payments, share buy backs and compensation paid out by financial institutions. Through a retention 
of earnings during buoyant periods, a bank is able to conserve excess capital which can be used to 
absorb asset write offs during less buoyant periods and periods of financial stress.”59
The introduction of forward looking provisions has been supported by various sources and bodies.60 
As well  as  illustrating  how dynamic  provisions  can  contribute  towards  mitigating  pro  cyclical 
effects,  a  preference  for  such  provisions  (in  comparison  to  prudential  reserves),  has  also  been 
particular  moving  to  marking  to  market  accounting,  rather  than  the  more  traditional  marking  to  maturity, 
exacerbated volatility in the accounts of banks – with valuation becoming practically impossible for some securities 
as the market in them disappeared.”;  ibid
56 R Repullo, J Saurina, and Carlos Trucharte, “How to Mitigate the Pro cyclical Effects of Capital Adequacy Rules” 
<http://www.eurointelligence.com/article.581+M5ff0e4ba595.0.html>
57 See the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending  Capital  Requirements  Directive  on  trading  book,  securitisation  issues  and  remuneration  policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf
Page 46 of 47
58  See  H  Hannoun,  „Towards  a  Global  Financial  Stability  Framework“  Bank  for  International  Settlements 
Publications, page 17; The methodology of the proposed “Too-Connected-to-Fail Capital Charge” highlighted by 
Jorg Chan Lau in his paper, comprises three important features . “First, it builds upon an intuitive principle: the 
capital charge must be proportional to the incremental contribution to societal losses (or risk) due to the failure of 
the institution. Second, by relating the concept of incremental contribution to systemic risk to concepts such as 
Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall, the TCTF capital charge is aligned with the spirit of Basel II. This alignment 
will  facilitate  its  adoption and implementation by supervisory agencies  and systemic risk regulators.  Third,  the 
measurement of the incremental contribution can be accomplished using a simple toolkit of models such as CoRisk 
analysis, network analysis, and portfolio credit risk models.” See J Chan Lau, „Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-
Connected-to-Fail  Institutions:  A Practical  Proposal”  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1566443 
and http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1098.pdf at page 21
59  See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 17
60   Bodies such as ECOFIN. See particularly, M Burroni et al, “Dynamic Provisioning: Rationale, Functioning, and 
Prudential Treatment” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531323 and 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/QF_57/QEF_57.pdf at page 6
highlighted.61 Burroni et al share the opinion that since provisions directly affect reported profits, 
they are more fully consistent with the idea of an expected loss model62 (than is the case with 
prudential reserves).63
The  benefits  of  provisions,  and  particularly  forward  looking  provisions,  will  be  considered  in 
greater detail under the concluding section of this paper.
D. Principles Governing the Operation of the Basel Committee’s Counter Cyclical Capital 
Buffer Proposal
In opting for the establishment of principles which would serve as guidance for the operation of its 
counter cyclical capital buffer proposal, the Basel Committee made provision for possible problems 
which could arise if a hard rules – based approach were to be adopted.64 Such problems, in the Basel 
Committee’s  opinion,  include  the  requirement  of  a  very  high  degree  of  confidence  (“that  the 
variables used to calculate the buffer requirement would always correctly perform as intended and 
would not send out false signals”).65 Despite allowing for a certain degree of flexibility – through 
such a principles and judgemental based approach, the Committee acknowledges the importance of 
establishing a “clear set of principles” which would not only “promote sound decision making in 
the setting of the counter cyclical buffer”66 but the need to restrict the scope of judgement allowed 
(through the establishment of such clear set of principles). Furthermore, it highlights the importance 
of “proper communication” (where exercising such judgemental based decisions) as constituting an 
integral aspect of the proposal.67
Whilst the principles generally serve as guidance in the use of judgement within the framework, 
Principle One specifically provides that buffer decisions are to be guided by “the objectives to be 
achieved by the buffer – namely the protection of the banking system against potential future losses 
when excess credit growth is associated with an increase in system-wide risk.”68
Principle Five highlights the importance of alternative tools such as “loan-to-value limits, interest 
rate qualification tests or sectoral capital buffers which may be deployed in situations where excess 
credit growth is concentrated in specific sectors but aggregate credit growth is judged not to be 
61  See ibid at page 23
62  “Regulatory capital”, it is argued, “should address “unexpected losses”- such losses being defined as “losses that 
are large but infrequent” . On the other hand, “loan loss reserves should address “expected losses”. See L Laeven 
and G Majnoni, “ Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdown: Too Much Too Late?” (2003) Journal of 
Financial Intermediation Volume 12 at page 195
63  M Burroni et al, “Dynamic Provisioning: Rationale, Functioning, and Prudential Treatment” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531323 and 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/QF_57/QEF_57.pdf at page 23
64  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July 2010 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 7
65  ibid
66  ibid
67  ibid
68 “The counter cyclical capital buffer is meant to provide the banking system with an additional buffer of capital 
to protect it against potential future losses, when excess credit growth in the financial system as a whole is associated 
with an increase in system-wide risk. The capital buffer can then be released when the credit cycle turns so that the 
released capital can be used to help absorb losses and reduce the risk of the supply of credit being constrained by 
regulatory capital requirements. A side benefit of operating the buffer in this fashion is that it may lean against the 
build-up of excess credit in the first place. As such, the buffer is not meant to be used as an instrument to manage 
economic cycles or asset prices. Where appropriate, those may be best addressed through fiscal, monetary and other 
public policy actions. It  is important that buffer decisions be taken after an assessment of as much of the relevant 
prevailing macroeconomic, financial and supervisory information as possible, bearing in mind that the operation of the 
buffer may have implications for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. “ see ibid
excessive or accompanied by increased system-wide risk. “
Such principles governing the operation of the Basel Committee’s Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer 
Proposal can be contrasted with the CEBS’ view which (in line with EFC and G20 decisions), 
underlies the need for counter cyclical approaches that are based on automatic rules. The need for 
rules which would serve as a form of “automatic stabilisers” is attributed to the following factors:69
- The importance of ensuring that deterrents exist to “overcome industry or political resistance 
to increase buffers during periods of economic booms and to provide a level playing field”
- The need for transparency and “clearly announced ex-ante in order to ensure that market 
participants are aware that banks build up buffers during periods of economic booms and 
run them down during recessive periods.
- CEBS’ acknowledgment that discretion is already envisaged under Pillar Two – hence the 
need for the existence of some rules
E. Financial Stability Forum Recommendations Aimed at Mitigating Pro cyclicality 
In  its  report70 on  “Addressing  Pro  cyclicality  in  the  Financial  System”,  the  Financial  Stability 
Forum’s recommendations to mitigate mechanisms that amplify pro cyclicality was extended to 
three areas:71
i) bank capital framework, ii) bank loan loss provisions as well as iii) leverage and valuation
issues. 
A summary of the recommendations relating to capital, as provided in the Report of the Financial 
Stability Forum is as follows:72
• That the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should strengthen the regulatory 
capital framework so that the quality and level of capital in the banking system increase 
during strong economic conditions and can be drawn down during periods of economic and 
financial stress;
• That the BCBS should revise the market risk framework of Basel II to reduce the reliance on 
cyclical VAR-based capital estimates;
• The BCBS should supplement the risk-based capital requirement with a simple, non-risk 
based measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system and put a floor 
under the Basel II framework;
• Supervisors should use the Basel Committee's enhanced stress testing practices as a critical 
part of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process to validate the adequacy of banks’ capital 
buffers above the minimum regulatory capital requirement;
• That the BCBS should monitor the impact of the Basel II framework and make appropriate 
69  Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
pages 3 and 4 <http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-
countercyclical-capital-b.aspx>
70  “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
71 Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital  Requirements  Directive  on  trading  book,  securitisation  issues  and  remuneration  policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf page 46 of 47
72  See “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” at pages 2 and 
3 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
adjustments to dampen excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements;
• That the BCBS carry out regular assessments of the risk coverage of the capital framework 
in relation to  financial  developments and banks’ evolving risk profiles and make timely 
enhancements.
F. Conclusion
In  its  attempt  to  adopt  “a  building  block  approach”  which  would  organise  the  work  on  pro 
cyclicality – the aim of this approach being “the alignment of development of tools to address pro 
cyclicality according to a specific set of objectives”, four identified objectives set out by the Basel 
Committee  in  its  December  2009 Consultative  Document  “Strengthening  the  Resilience  of  the 
Banking Sector”, are as follows:73
- To dampen any excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement; 
- To promote more forward looking provisions; 
- To conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector that can be 
used during periods of stress; and 
- To achieve the broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods 
of excess credit growth.”
In  accordance  with  the  CEBS’ observations,  counter  cyclical  mechanisms  should  be  i)  bank 
specific,  (ii)  based  on  risk  sensitive  concepts  -  should  also  be  compatible  with  the  incentive 
structure presented by Basel II (as well as Basel III), and (iii) should not be excessively burdensome 
in terms of data needs and computational efforts.74
Whilst efforts taken by the Committee appear to have focussed on capital – as evidenced by its 
Consultative  Document  on  Counter  Cyclical  Capital  Buffer  Proposal,  more  forward  looking 
provisions – as well as provisions which at are aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems 
attributed to “maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans”, would be greatly 
welcomed.
Hannoun highlights the advantages which a forward looking provisioning model offers over that of 
an  “incurred  loss”  provisioning  model.  In  his  opinion,  a  forward  looking  provisioning  model 
encourages banks to set aside provisions in a forward looking fashion based on expected losses – as 
opposed to the more backward looking provisions based on incurred losses.75 Furthermore, he adds 
that “ a forward looking approach not only captures actual losses more transparently, but is also less 
pro cyclical than the incurred loss provisioning model which is presently being used.”76
Further,  the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has acknowledged that tools 
which could be implemented as measures for mitigating cyclicality, exist beyond those measures 
proposed by the Basel Committee. As a result, it has taken up initiatives in relation to measures 
73  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ 
July 2010 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 1
74  Bank specificity would ensure that  counter  cyclical  tools  are “tailored  to  the  peculiarities  of  each bank’s 
portfolios”, risk sensitive based concepts would mitigate “perverse incentives – as well as opportunities for arbitrage”. 
See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
page 4
75 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 17
76  ibid
such as dynamic provisioning and supplementary measures which include leverage ratios.77
The proposed two new liquidity requirements, namely, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net 
Stable  Funding  Ratio  (NSFR),  respectively  serve  the  purposes  of  “ensuring  that  banks  have 
adequate funding liquidity to survive one month of difficult funding conditions (the LCR), and to 
address  the  mismatches  between the  maturity  of  a  bank’s  assets  and  that  of  its  liabilities  (the 
NSFR).”78 Whilst such liquidity requirements would help to address the critical issues arising as a 
result of maturity mismatches, the implementation of counter cyclical capital buffers – as well as 
these new liquidity requirements (LCR and NSFR) would be bolstered by introducing more forward 
looking provisions.
77 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
page 2 http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-
countercyclical-capital-b.aspx
78  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 
Capital  and  Liquidity  Requirements”  Bank  for  International  Settlements  Publications  August  2010  at  page  7 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
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